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Abstract 
Between September08 to June09, a period with significant market events and fluctuations, we 
surveyed UK online-brokerage customers at three-months intervals for their willingness to take 
risk, three-months expectations of returns and risks for the market and their own portfolio, and 
self-reported risk attitude. This unique dataset allowed us to analyze (a) how risk and return 
expectations, risk attitudes, and risk taking changed over time, (b) whether changes in risk taking 
were related to changes in expectations and/or risk attitudes, and (c) how changes in risk and 
return expectations related to recent objective changes in market returns and volatility. Risk taking 
decreased substantially from September08 to March09, and then increased again by June09. Self-
assessed risk attitude on average remained stable over this time period, while return and risk 
expectations changed. Objective/numeric assessments of return and risk expectations were 
significantly but not very highly correlated with subjective/affective judgments of the same 
quantities. Consistent with the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, observed changes in risk taking 
between periods were associated with changes in subjective expectations of market portfolio risk 
and returns, but not with changes in numeric predictions of market returns and their volatility, and 
also not with recent experienced changes in stock market performance. Our findings have 
implications for investment risk communication and investor education, since we show that 
changes in risk taking are related to subjective risk and return expectations that are not necessarily 
accurate.  
 
Keywords: Risk Taking, Risk—Return Models, Risk Attitude, Risk Expectation, Return 
Expectation 
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1 Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis and its aftermath bring questions about risk taking back 
to the fore. What determines how much risk private investors take? How and why does risk taking 
change when shocks to the system occur? How long do such changes in risk taking last?  
Malmendier and Nagel (2011malmendier) found long lasting cohort effects in investors who 
experienced the great depression but today‘s investors and their experiences are very different, 
and today‘s economic depressions of shorter duration may not have the same impact.  
The recent financial crisis also renewed calls for greater consumer information and 
protection, initiatives that require better knowledge about the investment decision processes of the 
public. Consumer finance has recently been identified as a field vastly understudied given its 
importance to the national and international economy (Campbell et al, 2011; Campbell, 2006; 
Tufano, 2009), at least in part because the economic transactions of individuals and households 
are hard to observe and interpret with traditional economic methods. As a result, psychologists 
and behavioral economists start using panel data, where representative sets of respondents answer 
questions about their values, beliefs, and expectations
1
, which (together with socioeconomic 
variables) can then be related to their hypothetical or real choices. Far from being a negative, the 
hypothetical nature of investment decisions like the ones used in our study allows people to show 
what they would do, based on their beliefs and expectations at a specific point in time, without 
constraints by inertia or other factors (for an overview of the pros and cons of survey data see 
                                                             
1 E.g., in the US, the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study (HRS) survey 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php?p=qnaires and the Survey of Economic Expectations http://www.disc. 
wisc.edu/econexpect/Index.html; in Germany, the ZEW Bankprognosen survey 
http://www.zew.de/de/publikationen/bankprognosen/index.php and the Socio-Economic Panel 
http://www.diw.de/deutsch/soep/29004.html.  
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Manski (2005)). 
 
By repeating such surveys over time, we can assess the effect of external events 
on beliefs and expectations and test the strong assumption that decision makers have objectively 
correct (i.e., rational) expectations.  
Our online survey, designed in collaboration with the behavioral finance team at Barclays 
Wealth, questioned the bank‘s online-brokerage customers between September08 and June09 in 
three-months intervals about their expectations of risk and returns of market and personal 
portfolios, their risk attitudes, and hypothetical risk taking behavior. Figure 1 charts the Financial 
Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) share index of all eligible companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange‘s main market (630 constituents) over the time period of our surveys, showing that this 
was a period of high stock market uncertainty and volatility, beginning in September08 before 
some important financial crisis events (around Lehman Brothers and AIG in the US, and around 
Northern Rock, HBOS, and other banks in the UK) and continuing through some additional 
declines and then some market recovery in 2009. Our respondents were online investors who 
frequently trade in stocks and other securities, providing greater external validity to our results 
than those of studies that have used student samples (e.g., Baucells and Villasis, 2010; Harrison et 
al., 2005).  
Insert Figure 1 here 
All four surveys measured financial risk taking with the task of investing £100,000 either 
into the U.K. stock market (FTSE-All-Share) or into a risk free asset with a guaranteed interest 
rate of 4%. Greater percentages invested into the stock market are indications of greater risk 
taking. We expected changes in risk taking over the period of the survey, given external events. 
Commenting on the financial crisis in September08, the New York Times reported that ―investors 
around the world frantically moved their money into the safest investments like Treasury bills‖, 
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and changes in risk taking have also been reported in other situations (Staw, 1976; Thaler and 
Johnson, 1990; M. Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). However, it is still an 
unresolved question what drives such changes in risk taking. Our goal was to decompose risk 
taking into different contributing variables and to examine the influence of changes in these 
components variables on any observed changes in risk taking.  
Classic portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) assumes that risk taking depends on investors' 
risk attitude as well as on the investors‘ return and volatility (variance) expectations:  
Risk Taking = f(Expected Value, Expected Volatility, Risk Attitude).          (1) 
 A more general risk-return framework (Sarin and M. Weber, 1993; E. Weber and 
Milliman, 1997; Jia et al., 1999) also allows for heterogeneous beliefs about the riskiness and the 
returns of investments: 
Risk Taking = f(Return Expectation, Risk Expectation, Risk Attitude).            (2) 
In such psychophysical risk-return models (E. Weber and Johnson, 2008), changes in risk taking 
can thus be the result of changes in one or more of these three determinants of risk taking:  
Risk Taking = f( Return Expectations, Risk Expectations, Risk Attitude). (3) 
A better understanding of the determinants of investor risk taking is not only of theoretical 
interest, but also has practical implications, as it can inform existing financial regulatory 
requirements in Europe and ongoing discussions about such regulation in the United States. Thus 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) by the European Parliament and the 
European Council (2004 and 2006) requires investment firms to obtain ―information as is 
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necessary for the firm to understand the essential facts about the customer (Article 35, 1)‖ and to 
elicit the customers' ―preferences regarding risk taking, his risk profile, and the purpose of the 
investment (Article 35, 4).‖ However, MiFID provides no guidelines about how or how often 
investment advisors need to elicit risk preferences and risk profiles, and what ―essential facts 
about the customer‖ should be collected. To close this gap, our study examines how best to assess 
risk attitudes and risk and return expectations, whether risk attitudes and/or risk or return 
expectations of investors change over time, and which of these changes impact risk taking.  
This elicitation was done in two different ways. Numeric judgments of best guess 
(median) percentage returns and expected volatility in returns (computed from median, worst-case 
(5% percentile), and best-case (95% percentile) percentage return estimates) can serve as proxies 
of individual investor beliefs most closely related to the return and risk variables of the classical 
risk—return model of risk taking of Equation 1. In contrast, elicitations of investors‘ more 
qualitative risk and return expectations on subjective rating scales (ranging from ‗extremely bad‘ 
to extremely good‘ for returns, and from ‗not at all risky‘ to ‗extremely risky‘ for risk) allow 
investors to incorporate feelings of hope or fear (Loewenstein at al., 2001), i.e., sentiments that 
may not make it into numeric estimates of such quantities but may nevertheless determine 
financial decisions (Barberis et al., 1998; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; E. Weber and Hsee, 1998). 
Building on results for expected risk by E. Weber at al., (2005), we predicted and found that the 
numeric and subjective measures of risk and return expectations were not highly correlated and 
that subjective expectation measures predicted risk taking far better than numeric expectations. 
As shown in Figure 2, risk taking (i.e., the percentage of their hypothetical £100,000 stake 
they would invest into the U.K. stock market for the next three months) changed significantly over 
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the surveyed period. Investments into the risky asset (vs. a guaranteed 4% return asset) dropped 
from 56.0% in September08 to 52.8% in December08, and even lower to 46.5% in March09, but 
then increased again to 53.5% in June09. Over that same time period, self reported risk attitudes 
(further described below) were stable on average. In contrast and also shown in Figure 2, 
subjective market portfolio risk expectations and return expectations, the measures most 
predictive of risk taking, changed across assessment periods. Changes in risk expectations 
mirrored changes in risk taking, with risk expectations increasing from September08 to 
December08, staying at the same level in March09, and then decreasing in June09. Very 
surprisingly, subjective market portfolio return expectations showed a small but significant and 
steady increase from September08 to June09. Previewing our results, changes in risk taking were 
explained by changes in subjective risk and return expectations for the market portfolio and not by 
any changes in self-reported risk attitude. This result remains stable even when we control for 
investors‘ recent (previous three months) personal stock market experience and for memories of 
recent market performance.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
These results have important practical implications, showing that risk attitude (measured 
in the way we did, with the distribution of responses shown in Figure 3) is a stable individual 
difference that does not need to be elicited repeatedly. In contrast, subjective risk and return 
expectations change with external market events, though not necessarily in a rational way. This 
suggests more frequent assessment of these quantities and some educational interventions to 
correct faulty expectations.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
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Our results extend the empirical and experimental literature on risk taking in several 
important ways. Whereas previous studies have documented changes in risk taking, using either 
field data (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008 and Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) or lab data in reaction 
to prior gains and losses (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; M. Weber and Zuchel 2005)), our study is the 
first to identify mediators of such changes (namely changes in subjective risk and return 
expectations), and to do so for a sample of online investors. Previous studies that examined 
changes in expectations and/or risk attitudes looked at only one of these variables in isolation (i.e., 
risk expectations (Glaser and M. Weber, 2005; E. Weber and Milliman, 1997), return expectations 
(Shiller et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 2004; Hanoch et al., 2006), risk attitudes (Sahm, 2007; Klos, 
2008)), and most of these studies did not relate changes in expectations and risk attitudes to 
changes in risk taking. In addition, we extend the results of Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and 
Dominitz and Manski (2007), who used survey data to show that greater expected equity returns 
were associated with a greater probability of holding stocks, in several ways: by including risk 
expectations and risk attitudes as predictor variables, by examining changes in return and risk 
expectations and their influence on changes in risk taking, and by using a different measure of risk 
taking, namely asset allocation. Finally, we extend results about the superiority of subjective (over 
numeric) judgments of risk to predict risk taking (E. Weber et al., 2005) to show that the same is 
true for subjective (over numeric) judgments of returns.  
Section 2 of this paper provides an extended literature review that motivates our 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents information on survey respondents and the survey design. The 
main results are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 discusses the implications of our results. 
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2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that risk taking of personal investors, i.e., their allocation of 
wealth to risky and risk free assets, can substantially vary over time and in response to market 
events. According to the Deutsche Aktieninstitut (2008), 6.2 million people in Germany directly 
held part of their wealth in stocks in 2000 at the height of the internet boom, whereas this number 
dropped to only 3.5 million by the end of 2008, in the course of the financial crisis. The Wall 
Street Journal (2008) similarly reports in an article on December 5, 2008 that, in response to the 
dramatic events on financial markets, investors pulled $72 billion from stock funds in October 
alone and moved their money into government bonds and cash holdings.  
Lab studies also show that risk taking is far from stable. Because preferences are 
constructed and stochastic, small differences in choice context can sometimes lead to preference 
reversals (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). Camerer (1989) and Hey and Orme (1994) gave 
respondents the same set of choice options twice, about 10 days apart, and found that 25%-30% of 
choices were different across the two time periods. Staw (1976) showed that risk taking 
substantially depended on previously experienced outcomes, with respondents taking significantly 
more risks on the same investment opportunity following a loss than a gain, a phenomenon he 
labeled escalation of commitment. This is consistent with the disposition effect identified by 
Odean (1998) and M. Weber and Camerer (1998), where investors are more reluctant to sell 
losing stocks than winning stocks. Thaler and Johnson (1990), on the other hand, found the 
reverse effect, i.e. enhanced risk taking after gains than after losses, which they called the house 
money effect. M. Weber and Zuchel (2005) subsequently reconciled the conflicting escalation of 
commitment and house money effects by showing that the framing of the situation matters. The 
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―house money effect‖ is prevalent when the situation is framed as a lottery, whereas the escalation 
of commitment effect is predominant when the situation is framed as an investment. E. Weber at 
al. (2002) also found differences in risk taking for risky financial choices when choices were 
described as gambling decisions than when they were described as investment decisions. 
These studies show that the personal experience of winning or losing can influence 
subsequent risk taking in independent risky, presumably because the affective reactions to prior 
gains or losses influence perceptions or feelings of risk and/or return of subsequent choice options 
(Loewenstein et. al., 2001). In other situations outcome feedback has a learning function. Positive 
or negative outcomes provide additional information about to be expected future returns and risks 
of this option. E. Weber et al. (2004) showed that risk taking is more variable for decisions from 
experience (where the decision maker must gradually learn about choice options from repeated 
outcome feedback), especially when low probability events are involved, than for decisions from 
description (where outcomes and their likelihood are numerically or graphically described). This 
is so because recently occurred outcomes have a large impact on decisions from experience. This 
suggests that economic shocks should increase risk expectations and lower return expectations 
thus should decrease risk taking and that these effects should disappear as outcomes become more 
favorable again. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) found that the great depression had a surprisingly 
long lasting impact by reducing the risk taking of people who lived through it, though this may 
have been the result of the extended time period (more than a decade) over which negative 
outcomes were experienced.  
In summary, there are reasons to expect that people‘s risk taking will vary from 
September08 to June09, which included at least one large market shock in the first month:   
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Hypothesis 1(a): Financial risk taking will vary over survey period, i.e., the proportion of 
their initial endowment of £100,000 invested into the U.K. stock market (FTSE-All-Share) 
and not into the risk free asset with a guaranteed interest rate of 4% will be statistically 
different from time period to time period. 
Rational models allow for changes in risk attitudes as the result of changes in income or 
wealth. The fact that an increase in wealth should result in a greater risk taking or a decrease in 
relative risk aversion is a key implication of difference habits models. When Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2008) tested this implication empirically, they found that, while wealth changes affected 
investors‘ decision to participate in stock markets, they hardly had any effect on asset allocation 
decisions, i.e. on the proportion a household invests in risky vs. risk free assets. Guiso et al. 
(2003) analyzed stock ownership in major European countries and also found that the percentage 
of wealth invested in the stock market was independent of investors' absolute level of wealth.  
Lab and field experiments that infer risk attitudes directly from choices (e.g. Holt and 
Laury (2002)) confound possible individual or situational differences in expected risks and returns 
with true differences in attitude towards risk (E. Weber and Milliman, 1997; E. Weber and Hsee, 
1998; E. Weber and Johnson, 2008). Because of this equating of risk attitude with risk taking, risk 
attitude often appears to be domain specific because risk taking varies across domains. Investment 
risk taking, for example, is typically not very highly correlated with risk taking in lottery tasks (E. 
Weber at al., 2002; Nosić and M. Weber, 2010). Panel surveys such as the Socio-Economic Panel 
or the Michigan Health and Retirement Survey have assessed risk attitude with psychometric 
methods instead, i.e., from answers to attitudinal statements on Likert-scales, a method also used 
in our survey. As one would expect of a trait measure, Klos (2008) found individual risk attitudes 
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reported in the 2004 and 2006 Socio-Economic Panel to be stable over time. Sahm (2007) also 
reported relatively high stability of risk attitudes within individuals over time using the Health and 
Retirement panel data set with more than 12,000 observations. Hence, we expected self-reported 
attitude towards risk to be stable across our sampling period: 
Hypothesis 1(b): Risk attitudes will be stable over survey period, i.e., self-reported risk 
attitudes will not be statistically different from time period to time period. 
  Changes in return expectations have been analyzed extensively empirically. Dominitz and 
Manski (2005) analyzed the dynamics of expectations in the Survey of Economic Expectations 
(1999-2001) and in the Michigan Survey of Consumers (2002-2004) and found that expectations 
were not perfectly stable over time but that differences between individuals were larger than 
differences within person over time. Using cross-sectional UBS/Gallup surveys, Fisher and 
Statman (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) showed that people's long- and short-term return 
expectations change substantially over time. Using data from the 1998-2003 surveys, Vissing-
Jorgensen (2003) show that average 1-year expectations go from a high of 15.8% in January 2000 
to a low of around 6% at the end of 2002, a change in expectations largely in line with returns 
experienced at the time, a result consistent with documented recency effects in experience-based 
learning and choice (E. Weber at al., 2004). In contrast, also using between-subject data, Glaser 
and M. Weber (2005) showed that return expectations after the 9/11 event of 2001 and the 
subsequent market downturn were not in line with recently experienced returns, and actually 
significantly higher than return expectations before the event, suggesting that their respondents 
believed in some form of market mean reversion.  
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Risk expectations can also be assumed to relate to individuals' past experiences with 
similar events or situations (E. Weber and Hsee, 1998). Loewenstein et al. (2001) argue that risky 
choice options are evaluated affectively (―risk as a feeling‖), and that prior outcomes, good as 
well as bad ones, influence this emotional response and the way individuals perceive the risk of a 
situation. E. Weber and Milliman (1997) and Mellers et al. (1997) experimentally showed that risk 
perceptions change after participants have experienced either good or bad outcomes. Consistent 
with such experiential learning, Glaser and M. Weber (2005) found volatility estimates to be 
significantly higher after the terror attacks of September 11 than before.  
In summary, previous evidence suggests that both risk and return expectations can vary 
substantially over time, as the result of macroeconomic events or individually experienced gains 
or losses. Whereas perceptions of risk seem to consistently increase under adverse conditions, 
expectations of returns seem at times to reflect experienced events and trends and at other times 
reflect a belief in mean reversion:  
Hypothesis 1(c): Risk and return expectations will fluctuate over sampled time period, i.e., 
will be statistically different from time period to time period. 
Our data will allow us to test what drives changes in risk taking. Consistent with the 
previously presented literature we hypothesize that changes in risk taking over time are driven by 
changes in risk and return expectations and not by changes in risk attitude.  
Hypothesis 1(d): Changes in risk taking will be mediated by changes in risk and return 
expectations. 
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Hypothesis 1 (c) raises questions about both the origin and the target of investors‘ risk and 
return expectations. Behavioral research suggests that investors‘ expectations may not only be 
based on economic data, but also on affective reactions such as hopes and fears. Asking investors 
to predict median as well as worst and best case returns for the next three months is the standard 
way to measure numeric risk and return expectations, but does not allow respondents to express 
their hopes and fears which may, nevertheless, influence their investment choices (E.  Weber et 
al., 2005). This suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Subjective measures of risk and return expectations will predict risk taking 
better than numeric measures, i.e., subjective measures of risk and return expectations will 
account for a greater proportion of the variance in risk taking across investors than numeric 
measures. 
3 Data 
3.1 Survey Respondents and Procedure 
Our online survey was designed in collaboration with the behavioral finance team at Barclays 
Wealth and administered in September08, December08, March09, and June09. Over 90% of 
respondents completed the September08 survey before the 12
th
 of September, i.e., before the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent downturn on financial markets.
1
 Respondents 
were selected as a stratified sample of Barclays Stockbrokers' client base, where Age, Number of 
deals per year, Number of holdings, and Portfolio value were used as strata. This provided a 
representative sample, while also accommodating our collaborating bank's desire to undersample 
                                                             
1
 Barclays did not collect the specific date on which each respondent completed the survey. However, the online 
service remained open only for a maximum of two weeks, with the majority of participants answering within the first 
week. 
 
 
15 
clients who trade very little (Number of deals per year≤1) or had a relatively low portfolio value 
(Portfolio value<£1,000).
2
 
A total of 19,251 clients (approximately 5% of customers) were invited by email in late 
August/early September to participate in the survey. Of those, 4,520 (23%) opened the email. Of 
those who opened the email, 849 (20%) went to the website and in the end, 479 out of these 849 
subjects completed the survey. This response rate is slightly lower but in the same ballpark as in 
similar studies by Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Glaser and M. Weber (2007). It took 
respondents on average 24 minutes to answer the survey. 
The 479 investors who answered the September08 survey were contacted again by email 
in late November/early December08 and invited to participate in a shorter version of the earlier 
survey.
3
 Of those, 240 participated for a second time in December. In addition, Barclays Wealth 
sent out an email invitation to a different set of 700 customers who had not been previously 
contacted, in order to increase the sample size.
4
 This resulted in an additional 138 respondents 
who joined the panel in December and who completed the longer version of the survey at this 
point. In March09, all 617 investors who had previously participated in at least one round were 
contacted again and invited to participate in one more round, with the shorter version of the 
                                                             
2 In all strata in which trades were less than once a year or portfolio value of less than £1,000, a lower percentage of 
clients were invited to participate in the survey than in the remaining strata . Note that although we did undersample, 
we did not exclude these clients, and more than 16% of approached individuals had a portfolio value below £1,000. 
 
3 The first version of the survey included more demographics, individual characteristics, and various behavioral client 
profiling questions, that are used by Barclays Wealth within their advisory process. 
4 These 700 had previously participated in another marketing related event of Barclays Wealth and had indicated their 
willingness to participate in surveys.  
 
 
 
16 
survey. Overall, 259 investors participated only once, 138 twice, 131 three times, and 89 all four 
times.  
In contrast to previous studies of online brokerage customers (Dorn and Huberman, 2005; 
Glaser and M. Weber, 2007) that analyzed one-period survey responses, our dataset provided 
repeated observations of the same investors over time, thus allowing us to regress changes in the 
dependent measure (risk taking) onto changes in a series of predictor variables. Such analysis 
requires participants who completed at least two consecutive surveys, i.e. in September and 
December, in December and March, in March and June, or participated in three or four 
consecutive periods.  
To identify potential selection biases, we compared survey participants to the adult British 
population, and also compared investors who participated only once with those that participated 
twice, three or four times, respectively. Table 1 provides mean demographics for all participants 
of our study (Group
all
) and for the adult British population (GB
all
), respectively. The next four 
columns provide mean demographics separately for respondents who participated only once 
(Group
once
, N=259), twice (Group
twice
, N=138), three times (Group
threetimes
 N=131), and in all four 
surveys (Group
four
, N=89). The average age of survey participants is 51.4 years, four years older 
than the average British adult. Survey participants are also more likely to be married (0.74 vs. 
0.52) or male (0.93 vs. 0.49) compared to the British average. Gross income is highly skewed with 
a mean of £76,616 and a median of £60,000 and substantially larger than the mean British income 
of £30,000. Clearly, our respondents are not representative of the typical British adult. However, 
being predominantly male and having a substantially larger gross income than the overall 
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population makes them similar to the German private investor population sampled by Dorn and 
Huberman (2005).  
There are hardly any differences between the investor subgroups who participated once, 
twice, three, or four times, respectively. Only the level of investable wealth, measured in 9 
categories from 1 (£0 - £10,000) to 9 (> £1 million), differs significantly. Investors who 
participated only once had substantially lower investable wealth than investors who participated 
more frequently. Since the main goal of our study is to analyze changes in different variables at an 
individual level over time, differences in wealth between the four subgroups should not be 
problematic. Investor wealth was also included as a control variable. We conducted a similar 
analysis (not reported here) comparing demographics as well as expectations for those who 
participated in each subsequent round vs. those who did not participate in the next round and 
found no significant differences.   
Insert Table 1 here 
3.2 Survey Design  
 Besides demographics and other individual characteristics described above and collected 
only in the first survey in which respondents participated, the following variables, summarized in 
Table 2, were elicited every three months. The appendix presents the exact wording of the 
questions as well as the order in which the questions were elicited. 
(Financial) Risk taking: Participants were asked to invest £100,000 either into the U.K. stock 
market (FTSE-All-Share) or into a risk free asset with a guaranteed interest rate of 4%, with a 
greater percentage allocated to the stock market indicating greater risk taking. Using hypothetical 
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choices vs. transaction data has advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage of using real 
transaction data to make inferences about risk taking in portfolio allocations is that it is hardly 
possible to obtain complete information on total asset holdings of individuals at all banks at which 
they have an account. We also know that real transactions are subject to investor inertia and 
temporary practical constraints that may not be constant from period to period. Hypothetical risk 
taking with a new stake of equal size provided at each time period does not have these constraints 
and thus offers a better measure of the effect of changes in risk and return expectations or changes 
in risk attitude. However, hypothetical actions are hypothetical, and some might argue that such 
data reflect cheap talk. As outlined in the introduction, survey data should be seen as an additional 
and complementary source of data to understand determinants of changes in investor risk taking.   
Risk attitudes: In the September and December08 surveys we used the three questions shown in 
Table 2 from Barclays Wealth's 8-question psychometric scale of investors' risk attitude. Brooks 
et al. (2008) show that this scale differentiates individuals with low risk tolerance from those with 
high risk tolerance and that it has high reliability. All three questions were answered on a 7-point 
Likert scale with the endpoints ―1 = Strongly Disagree‖ and ―7 = Strongly Agree‖.5 In the March 
and June survey, only the most diagnostic of these three risk attitude measures was elicited (Risk 
Attitude 2: ―It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment.‖).  
Expected return and expected risk: As described above, risk and return expectations were 
elicited in two different ways, one quantitative/numeric, the other qualitative/subjective. Crossed 
                                                             
5 Bollen and Barb (1981) and Alwin and Krosnick (1991) have shown that reliability, validity, and discriminating 
power increases up to 7-point scales and that, after this, additional effects can hardly be observed. Moreover, 
Viswanathan et al. (2004) argue that the number of response categories should be as close as possible to a natural 
number of categories for a specific question, and that one should not overburden respondents with too hard a task.   
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with that, we also asked investors for their risk and return expectations over the next three months 
for (a) the U.K. market portfolio (FTSE-All-Share) and (b) for their own investment portfolio at 
the bank. To get respondents‘ quantitative/numeric risk and return expectations, we asked them to 
state their best guess (median estimate) for the three-month percentage return, followed by a lower 
and upper bound on the three-months percentage return they had provided, such that there would 
be only a 5% chance that the return in three months would be below the lower bound and a 5% 
chance that it would be higher than the upper bound. Numeric return expectations for the market 
(Market-Return-Num.) or for an investor's own portfolio (Own-Return-Num.) are equal to the best 
guess for the market and own portfolio return, respectively. To obtain numeric risk expectations, 
we used the two point approximation to the variance of outcomes suggested by Keefer and Bodily 
(1983), which transforms stated upper and lower bounds into volatility estimates and has been 
widely used in the empirical literature (e.g. Graham and Harvey (2005) and Glaser et al. (2007)).
6
 
This provided us with the two numeric risk expectation measures Market-Risk- Num. and Own-
Risk-Num.  
For the two qualitative/subjective measures of return expectations (Market-Return-Subj. 
and Own-Return-Subj.), respondents were asked how they would rate the returns they expected 
from the market and their own portfolio over the next three months, on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from ―1 = Extremely bad return‖ to ―7 = Extremely good return‖. Similarly, the 
qualitative/subjective measures of risk expectations (Market-Risk-Subj. and Own-Risk-Subj.) were 
                                                             
6 For the two point approximation of variance we use: 
, see Keefer and Bodily (1983, p. 597)   
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obtained as judgments of expected market risk and expected own portfolio risk over the next three 
months, on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ―1 = Not risky at all‖ to ―7 = Extremely risky‖.  
 Past performance: We elicited participants' memories of past performance, both of the U.K. 
stock market in general (FTSE-All-Share) and of their own portfolio over the last three months, 
using two elicitation methods: (a) as a numeric (percentage return) estimate (Perf.Own-Num and 
Perf.Market-Num) and (b) as a qualitative subjective judgment on 7-point Likert scales with the 
endpoints ―1 = Extremely bad return‖ and ―7 = Extremely good return‖ (Perf.Own-Subj. and 
Perf.Market-Subj.). In addition, we also asked respondents for their numeric (percentage) estimate 
of past three-months returns of their personal investments held at other banks (Perf.External)..  
Insert Table 2 here 
3.3 Differences in Responses between Groups With Different Response Rates 
To test for any selection bias in our data, i.e., the question whether participants who completed 
one, two, three or four surveys provided different answers on any of the above variables, we 
conducted a series of Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. We found a very small number of significant 
differences (not more than can be expected by chance alone), scattered over different variables 
with no discernable pattern, suggesting that there were no differences on these variables between 
these groups of respondents. As mentioned earlier, we did a similar analysis for those who 
answered in the following round vs. those who did not answer, which also showed no significant 
differences. 
4 Results 
4.1 Risk Taking, Risk Attitude, and Risk and Return Expectations across Time 
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Table 3 reports the means of all repeatedly elicited variables in our study, for the four 
assessed periods.
7
 The last three columns in Table 3 report Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics 
that indicate whether the difference in value for that variable is significant between two successive 
survey administrations. These tests only use data from respondents who participated in the two 
respective surveys, i.e., use only within-subject data.  
For Risk-Taking we observe, consistent with Hypothesis 1(a), that the percentage of their 
£100,000 stake that investors are willing to place into the market (FTSE-All-Share) varies 
substantially. As shown in Figure 2 and Table 3, risk taking decreases from 56.0% in 
September08, to 52.8% in December08 and further to 46.5% in March09, and then increases again 
to 53.5% in June09. All differences are significant at the 1% level.  
In contrasts, there are hardly any changes in self-reported risk attitudes over the four time 
periods. Risk Attitude 2 (―It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment‖) 
and Risk Attitude 7 (―Even if I experienced a significant loss on an investment, I would still 
consider making risky investments‖) are virtually the same in September08 and in December08. 
Risk Attitude 6 (―I am a financial risk taker‖) rises slightly from 4.43 to 4.61 from September08 to 
December08, a difference significant at the 5% level, but in a direction that is inconsistent with 
the observed declines in risk taking over that time period. From March09 onward, we only elicited 
Risk Attitude 2, the single most diagnostic measure from Barclays Wealth’s 8-question scale, with 
a distribution of responses across investors that covered the full range of values as shown in 
Figure 3, and which, as Table 3 shows, did not change across time periods. At the individual-
subject level, we find some variation but over 56% of those participating in all four rounds do not 
                                                             
7
 Table 3 includes values only for respondents who participated in at least two of the four surveys, but results are 
essentially the same  if we either include the data for all 617 investors or restrict ourselves to the 89 investors who 
participated four times. 
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change their self-reported risk attitude scores by more than one point on the 7-point Likert scales. 
This stability of risk attitudes across time is in line with findings in Sahm (2007) and Baucells and 
Villasis (2010) and supports Hypothesis 1(b).  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1(c), risk expectations change considerably over time, in ways mostly 
consistent with market events. Thus all four risk expectation measures (Market-Risk-Num., 
Market-Risk-Subj., Own-Risk-Num., and Own-Risk-Subj.) were significantly higher in 
December08 than September08, following the Lehman Brothers collapse and subsequent market 
decline and volatility increase, as shown in Table 3. Whereas the numeric volatility estimates of 
risk stay steady or increase from December08 to March09 and June09, consistent with market 
behavior, subjective risk expectations (that are likely more affect- than analysis-based) stay steady 
from December08 to March09, but then significantly decrease by June09, indicating perhaps some 
habituation to the continuing volatility, i.e., a decrease in worry or concern.  
Return expectations are similarly variable over time, consistent with Hypothesis 1(c), 
though less so than risk expectations. As shown in Table 3, both the numeric and the subjective 
return expectations either stay steady or increase from September08 to June09
8
. This suggests that 
respondents expect some form of market correction for subsequent periods during this period of 
market turbulence and losses. This expectation is only accurate in the last period, from March09 
to June09 where returns in the market did increase by 9%, where return expectations actually, if 
anything, decreased slightly.  
As also shown in Table 3, investors‘ numeric estimates of past market performance were 
not too far off actual market returns. The performance of the FTSE-All-Share for the three month 
                                                             
8 The only exception is a slight, but non-significant decrease in the numeric return expectation from March09 to 
June09. 
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period before the questionnaire was distributed was approximately -12% for September08, -25%  
for December08, -8%  for March09, and +14% for June09.  
In summary, our results are consistent with Hypotheses 1(a) to (c). Moreover, our results 
are robust, i.e., remain essentially the same if we analyze differences only for those investors who 
participated three or four times or if we include all observations at each point of time. 
Insert Table 3 here 
4.2 Differences between Numeric and Subjective Assessments of Risk and Return 
Expectations for Market Portfolio and Own Portfolio 
 We now proceed to test Hypothesis 2. Table 4(a) Panel A shows the correlations between 
the numeric and the subjective measure of the four solicited expectations (returns and risks, for 
the market and own portfolio, respectively), for each of the four time periods of elicitation. The 
pattern of correlations is very consistent across time periods. While all correlations are significant 
(at the .05 level or higher), there is much greater agreement (i.e., higher correlation) between the 
numeric and the subjective elicitation value for return expectations than for risk expectations 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test z = 2.52; p<.02). This pattern also shows for the correlation of 
changes (Panel B) which are generally lower, significant for return and not significant for risk. 
This is consistent with prior studies that have found much closer correspondence between 
subjective return expectations and normative values such as the expected value of past returns of 
investment options than between subjective risk expectations and normative values such as the 
variance or standard deviation of past returns (E. Weber and Hsee, 1998; E. Weber at al., 2005).  
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 Table 4(b) Panel A shows that there are reasonably high correlations (from .48 to .64) 
between investors‘ risk and return expectations for the market and their own portfolios when the 
expectations are assessed numerically. This is also true for return expectations assessed 
subjectively (from .45 to .64), but the correlations are much reduced (from .27 to .37) for 
subjectively assessed risk expectations. While investors on average exhibit some optimism or 
―better than average‖ bias, as shown in Table 3, where subjective return estimates are better (t = 
7.92, p<.00001) and subjective risk estimates lower (t = -13.25; p<.00001) for own portfolios than 
for the market portfolio, it is possible that different feelings influence the subjective risk 
expectations of different investors for their own portfolios (for some perhaps hope, while for 
others fear), lowering the correlation between this estimate and their subjective risk expectation 
for the market. Again the results are remarkably consistent across the four time periods. Looking 
at correlations of changes (Panel B), again, the same pattern shows up as in Panel A with most 
correlation coefficients being a little bit lower.  
 Finally Table 4(c) Panel A provides some results indicative of investors‘ financial 
sophistication. Finucane et al. (2000) observed that, as a result of using their affect towards an 
investment to judge both its expected risk and return, people‘s risk and return expectations often 
show a negative relationship (i.e., options with higher return expectations are being perceived as 
carrying lower risks), contrary to the actual positive relationship between risks and returns 
between assets in efficient markets. This negative relation can be seen as evidence for the 
influence of a specific feeling about a choice option influencing both sets of judgments, with more 
positive-feeling choice options being seen as less risky and as yielding greater returns. Table 4(c) 
shows that, different from studies using university students, the investors in our study did not 
show such a negative relationship in their numeric judgments about their own portfolio, i.e., in an 
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analysis across subjects their numeric judgments correctly implied a positive relationship between 
risk and return expectations for their own portfolios.
9
  However, for the more qualitative 
/subjective judgments of expectations, even this set of relatively prosperous and experienced 
personal investors showed significant negative correlations between what they expected for risks 
and returns for the market portfolio, and much smaller positive or zero correlation for their own 
portfolio, suggesting that subjective feelings can affect the perceptions and actions of even 
financially sophisticated investors (also see Holtgrave and E. Weber, 1993).  
Panel B shows that basically no relation between changes in risk and return expectations is present 
in our data.   
Insert Table 4 here  
4.3 What Predicts Risk Taking and Drives Changes in Risk Taking? 
Although we are interested in the relation of changes of variables, we first present an 
analysis testing Equation (2), the more general risk-return framework. Table 5 shows (Column 1)  
that risk taking depends on risk attitude. Column 2 shows that risk taking also depends on 
subjective market risk and return expectation (as proposed by the framework) and also on numeric 
return expectation (though less significantly) but not on numeric risk expectation (which turns out 
to be significant in Column 4 where demographic control variables are included). Column 3 
shows that higher past performance measured on a subjective scale results in higher risk taking. 
Including demographics (Column 4), we find that being male and having a larger number of 
dependents leads to (marginally) significant more risk-taking. All other variables show no effect.   
                                                             
9
 Within investors the picture is inconclusive, some show positive others negative correlations over time. 
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Insert Table 5 about here    
 The analysis underlying Table 5 allows us to further test Hypothesis 2. We run two Tobit 
regressions with risk taking as the dependent variable and either numeric expectations for return 
and risk or subjective expectations for return and risk as independent variables (including round 
dummies). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find the r
2
  to be higher for subjective factors (.0171 
vs. .0056), the t-statistics to be larger (return: subjective 8.79 vs. numeric 3.52; risk: subjective –
4.85 vs. numeric – 1.10) and the F-value to be larger for the regression with subjective factors 
(31.16 vs. 8.08).   
Table 6 shows the same variables as listed in Table 3, now separated for investors whose 
risk taking either increased or decreased between two successive time periods (Δ RiskTaking >=0; 
Δ RiskTaking < 0) for the three comparison time periods (September08-December08; 
December08-March09; March09-June09). The last column for each time comparison shows the 
results of Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. 
Variables that differ between these two groups of respondents are potential predictors of 
risk taking. Table 6 shows that this rules out measures of risk attitudes, which hardly show any 
difference between the two groups for all three transitions in time.
10
 Changes in investors‘ risk 
and return expectations for their own portfolios (both numeric and subjective) mostly also do not 
differ significantly between the two groups (Δ R.T.+ and Δ R.T.-). The same is true for changes in 
their numeric risk and return expectations for the market portfolio, Diff. Market-Return-Num. and 
Diff. Market-Risk-Num. However, for changes in subjective/qualitative risk and return 
                                                             
10 Note that Diff. Risk Attitude 6 and Diff. Risk Attitude 7 were not elicited in March. Therefore, we cannot analyse 
changes in these variables from December to March. 
 
 
 
27 
expectations for the market portfolio we find large and reliable differences between the two 
groups. Investors who take more risks from one time period to the next (Δ R.T.+) expect market 
returns (Diff. Market-Return-Subj.) to be substantially higher over the next three month, while 
investors who take less risk (Δ R.T.-) expect market returns to stay fairly stable over time. 
Differences in changes in subjective market return expectations between the two groups are 
significant for all three time periods, suggesting that changes in subjective market return 
expectations are related to changes in risk taking. This result remains stable when we rerun the 
analysis only for investors who participated in all four surveys. The reverse is true for subjective 
market risk expectations (Diff. Market-Risk-Subj.): investors who take less risk from one time 
period to the next (Δ R.T.- ) expect market risk to increase for the next period, whereas investors 
who take more risk (Δ R.T.+ ) expect it to decrease. Table 6 also shows that changes in past 
performance estimates are hardly related to changes in risk taking, as only Diff. Past Perf. Self 
Subj. is significantly different for the two groups.
11
 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 here 
We use multivariate Tobit regressions to determine what combinations of factors drive 
changes in risk taking, since our dependent measure (change in percentage of £100,000 invested 
                                                             
11 Past performance variables affected risk taking indirectly, by affecting both numeric and subjective return 
expectations across time periods, as shown in Table 7, mostly in rational or sensible ways. I.e., Past market 
performance affects market return expectations, whereas past own portfolio performance affects own portfolio return 
expectations. Similarly, numeric judgments of past performance predict numeric judgments of return expectations, 
whereas subjective judgments of past performance predict subjective return expectations.  Table 7 shows no sign of 
belief in mean reversion: only the subjective evaluations of past market performance are negatively correlated with 
numeric market return predictions.      
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into the market) is censored from below (-100) and from above (+100). Table 8 reports the results 
of clustered Tobit regressions of changes in risk taking from one time period to the next.
12
 . 
Column 1 of Table 8 shows that changes in self-reported risk attitude (Diff. Risk Attitude 
2) do not explain changes in risk taking but the coefficients are in the right direction. This result 
still holds when we rerun the regression while excluding investors who reported the same risk 
attitude in two subsequent time periods. Column 2 shows that, in contrast to changes in risk 
attitude, changes in subjective risk and return expectations do explain changes in risk taking. The 
larger subjective market return expectations are in the current survey round (compared to the 
previous round), the more risk is taken in the current round (compared to the previous round). The 
greater the perceived level of risk of the market in the current round, the less risk is taken in the 
current round. The same regression with numeric estimates of expectations instead of subjective 
ones (Column 3) shows that changes in numeric expectations cannot explain changes in risk 
taking, confirming Hypothesis 2.  
The regression in Column 4 shows that changes in subjective market risk and return 
expectations continue to predict changes in risk taking when changes in risk attitude are 
simultaneously included as a predictor variable. In Columns 5 and 6, we add changes in numeric 
market expectations, changes in recent market performance, and various demographics as 
additional predictor variables. Multicollinearity is no issue for adding the numerical expectations, 
since the correlations between numerical and subjective risk and return expectations are relatively 
low, as discussed above. However, multicollinearity is an issue for the numeric and subjective 
judgments about past market performance, which were highly correlated. Thus we only added one 
                                                             
12
 Since Diff. Risk Attitude 6 and Diff. Risk Attitude 7 were not elicited at all time periods, they were not included in 
the analyses. We took into account that most investors participated in more than one survey by clustering our 
regressions over respondents 
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or the other to the regression equation. As shown in Columns 5 and 6, neither one of them predicts 
changes in risk taking, and neither do changes in numeric market risk and return expectations. The 
only two variables that consistently and reliably predict changes in risk taking are changes in 
investors‘ subjective expectations of market risks and returns.13 
Insert Table 8 and Figure 4 here 
 Support for Hypothesis 1(d) that changes in risk taking are mediated by changes in risk 
and return expectations is provided by the results of a mediation analysis (e.g., Shrout and Bolger, 
2002), summarized in Figure 4. For each of the three transitions in time (September08 to 
December08 to March09 to June09), we regressed risk taking in the two subsequent periods on a 
time dummy. As discussed earlier and shown by the significant regression coefficients for the 
direct link between time and risk taking in the bottom part of Figure 4, risk taking differed 
significantly between the two time periods for all three transitions. We next tested the 
precondition for possible mediation of changes in risk taking by changes in subjective risk and 
return expectations, namely whether risk and return expectations significantly differed between 
time periods. As shown by the coefficients for the links between time and either risk or return 
expectations on the left side of the top portion of Figure 4, this precondition was satisfied for two 
of the three time transitions. As shown by the coefficients for the links between both risk or return 
expectations and risk taking on the right side of the top portion of Figure 4, risk taking was 
significantly predicted by risk and return expectations across time periods. Most importantly, 
when risk and return expectations are added to the time dummy to predict risk taking, the time 
                                                             
13
 As a robustness check we redid the analysis of Table 8 excluding extreme values for numeric changes. We define 
those by Diff. Market-Return-Num and Diff Post Perf. Market Num being larger than 50% and Diff.-Risk-Num being 
larger than 0.5. In regression 3, 5, and 6 we loose 4, 8 and 4 observations. The number 50% might look pretty large 
but there was a three month period where the real market return was about -25%. The results basically do not change. 
The coefficient of Diff Risk Attitude 2 becomes marginally significant.    
 
 
30 
predictor is no longer significant for the two time transitions for which the precondition for 
mediation was satisfied (i.e., September08 December08, and March09 June09). The 
difference in magnitude and significance level of the indirect effect of time on risk taking (shown 
by the coefficients for that link in the top part of Figure 4) and the direct effect in the bottom part 
of Figure 4 provide evidence that changes in risk and return expectations successful mediate 
observed changes in risk taking over time.   
5 Conclusion 
In repeated surveys conducted between September08 and June09, a sample of Barclays 
Wealth online brokerage personal investors showed substantial changes in risk taking over time. 
Using risk-value models that allow for individual and situational differences in risk and return 
expectations as well as differences in self-reported risk attitude, we tie these changes in risk taking 
to changes in subjective expectations of risk and return, whereas risk attitudes remain stable over 
time, as one would expect from a psychological trait. Any existing small changes in self-reported 
risk attitude do not predict changes in risk taking. These results are stable when we control for 
past investment performance and demographics.  
Consistent with previous work on risk expectations (E. Weber et al., 2005), we find that 
qualitative subjective judgments of expected market risk and return predict risk taking, but that 
investors‘ quantitative estimates of market returns and volatility, far closer to the traditional 
finance risk-return model, fail to predict observed changes in risk taking. Subjective judgments of 
risk and return expectation continue to be significant predictors of risk taking even when 
investors‘ quantitative estimates of expected market returns and their volatility are included in the 
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regression, suggesting that it is the more emotion-based components of these judgments that drive 
changes in risk taking. 
We extend previous findings in the literature on changes in risk taking, expectations, and 
risk attitudes. First, our unique dataset allows us to analyze changes in risk taking, expectations, 
and risk attitudes of online broker customers. The personal investors in our sample are affluent 
and frequently trade in stocks and other securities, and are financially sophisticated. They do not 
show myopia in information use, in the sense that they do not use/substitute subjective risk and 
return expectations for their own personal portfolios when they make risky decisions involving the  
market portfolio. They also do not show any halo effect in their numeric risk and return 
predictions,
14
 and their risk taking is not directly influenced by recent investment gains or losses. 
Thus it is fair to say that our results probably place a lower bound of the degree and type of 
irrationality that one might expect to see in a broader sample of personal investors.  
Whereas previous studies in the literature analyzed only changes in risk taking (see e.g. 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011)), in expectations (see e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003)), or in risk 
attitude (see e.g. Sahm (2007)), our study examined the relationship between these variables. This 
allowed us to examine the mechanism or channel by which risk taking might change over time. 
Another fortuitous feature of our study is the fact that the first survey was conducted in the 
beginning of September08, i.e., just before extreme turmoil in financial markets. Hence, we are 
able to analyze the effect of substantial stock price drops on risk attitudes and expectations by 
comparing the expectations and attitudes shortly before the crisis to those during and after the 
crisis, using the same panel of investors. While only a direct manipulation of risk and return 
                                                             
14 Though they do show one for their subjective judgments of expected risks and returns.  
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expectations would allow us to conclusively establish their causal role in changing risk taking, our 
within-subject repeated-measures design and the results of the mediation analysis strongly suggest 
that observed changes in risk taking over the survey period were the result of changes in 
subjective feelings about future market risk and return, and not changes in risk attitude. 
We observed one significant change in self-reported risk attitude. Risk Attitude 6 (―I am a 
financial risk taker‖) showed a significant increase (from 4.43 to 4.61) from September08 to 
December08, but in a direction inconsistent with the observed decline in risk taking over that time 
period. Investors who we know had been losing money in the stock market between September08 
and December08, might have concluded that they must be greater risk taker than they had 
previously thought, in light of these losses. No such changes in self-reports of risk attitudes were 
observed for the more diagnostic self-report measure Risk Attitude2. 
Our findings should be valuable for banking practitioners. We show that risk attitudes - if 
measured correctly and without confounding effects - seem to be fairly stable and that changes in 
risk taking seem to be caused by changes in risk and return expectations, not by changes in risk 
attitudes and not, at least directly, by changes in recent market or personal portfolio performance. 
Thus, practitioners urged (e.g, by the MiFID of the European Union (2006)) to elicit their 
customers' risk profiles and risk preferences can argue that an elicitation of risk attitudes needs not 
to be carried out on a quarterly basis. However, as we find that investors have risk and return 
expectations that change significantly over time and seem to guide their investment behavior, 
there is ample room for helping investors make better decisions. Our data show that investors‘ risk 
and return expectations are influenced by recent events and change considerably over time, and do 
so in a number of ways not consistent with rational theory. Future research should investigate 
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which other variables drive risk taking behavior. We know from previous studies that 
overconfidence and optimism (Nosic and Weber 2010) and even anticipating optimism by others 
lead to higher risk taking. There are most likely other psychological factors as well, that still have 
to be investigated,  
Our results indicate that it might be worthwhile for practitioners to elicit their clients' risk 
and return expectations more frequently and to provide some corrective feedback at the end of 
regular time periods (e.g., at the end of each calendar year), as investors seem to persistently 
underestimate and subjectively underappreciate the volatility of the market, putting hope over 
fear.  
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Table 1. Demographic characteristics 
The first two columns compare mean demographics for survey participants (Group
all
) to the adult 
British population (GB
all
) (from the U.K. Office for National Statistics). The next four columns 
report mean demographics for the subsets of participants who took part in only one survey 
(Group
once
), two surveys (Group
twice
), three surveys (Group
thrice
), or all four surveys (Group
four
). 
Age, Number of dependants, and Median gross income are self-explanatory. Gender and Marital 
status are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the investor is male and married, respectively. 
Investable wealth is measured in 9 categories from 1 (£0 - £10,000) to 9 (> £1 million).  
 Group
all
 GB
all
   Group
once
 Group
twice
 Group
thrice
 Group
four
 
Age 51.42 47.66  50.77 50.65 51.43 54.45 
Number of 
dependents 
1.14 -  1.12 1.23 1.17 1.00 
Gender 0.93 0.49  0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96 
Median gross 
income (in £) 
60,000 30,000  60,000 60,000 65,000 53,000 
Marital status 0.74 0.52  0.76 0.70 0.77 0.72 
Investable wealth  
(in £) 
4.80 -  4.50 4.53 5.03 5.73 
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Table 2: Definition of survey variables  
Variable Question / Description 
Risk Taking  
Risk Taking 
Measures the (hypothetical) amount of money an individual is willing to 
invest into the FTSE-All-Share compared to a risk free asset with a 4% 
return (0 = invest everything into the risk free asset; 100 = invest everything 
into the risky stock market). 
Risk Attitude  
Risk Attitude 2 
"It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment." (1 = 
Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 6 "I am a financial risk taker." (1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 7 
"Even if I experienced a significant loss on an investment, I would still 
consider making risky investments." (1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly 
agree) 
Expectations  
Market-Return-Num. 
Measures individuals' return expectations for the FTSE-All-Share in 3 
months in percent 
Market-Risk-Num. 
Measures individuals' volatility expectations for the FTSE-All-Share in 3 
months by transforming estimates of bounds into volatility estimates. 
Market-Return-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns you expect from an investment in the UK 
stock market (FTSE-All- Share) over the next 3 months?" (1 = Extremely 
bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
Market-Risk-Subj. 
"Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the UK stock market 
(FTSE-All- Share) is?" (1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Own-Return-Num. 
Measures individuals' return expectations for the own portfolio at the bank in 
3 months in percent 
Own-Risk-Num. 
Measures individuals' volatility expectations for the own portfolio at the 
bank in 3 months transforming estimates of bounds into volatility estimates. 
Own-Return-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns you expect from your own portfolio over 
the next 3 months?" (1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
Own-Risk-Subj. 
"Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the investments in your 
own portfolio are?" (1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Past Performance  
PastPerf.-External 
What do you think the return of your investments held at other banks over 
the past 3 months was? 
PastPerf.-Market-Num. 
"What is your best estimate of the return of the UK stock market (FTSE-All-
Share) over the past 3 months?" 
PastPerf.-Market-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns of the UK stock markets (FTSE-All-Share) 
over the past 3 months?" (1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
PastPerf.-Own-Num. 
"What do you think the return of your own portfolio over the past 3 months 
was?" 
PastPerf.-Own-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns of your own portfolio over the past 3 
months?" (1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
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Table 3: Survey Responses across Time Periods 
This table reports mean responses on indicated variables by time of elicitation. The last three 
columns provide z-statistics of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of differences between successive time 
periods, for those investors who participated in both time periods.  
* significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
 Mean 
Difference 
Dec-Sept 
Difference 
Mar-Dec 
Difference 
June-Mar 
 Sept. Dec. March June z-score z-score z-score 
 (N=265) (N=305) (N=239) (N=188)    
        
Risk-Taking  56.02 52.77 46.52 53.47 -2.59** -3.90** 3.86** 
        
Risk Attitude 2 3.34 3.63 3.55 3.55 1.89 -0.73 0.46 
Risk Attitude 6 4.43 4.61 - - 2.51* -  
Risk Attitude 7 5.04 5.06 - - 0.39 -  
        
Market-Return-Num 1.57 3.57 5.42 4.25 1.66 3.31** -1.11 
Market-Risk-Num 0.052 0.075 0.072 0.090 7.29** -0.57 2.54** 
Market-Return-Subj 3.50 3.67 3.84 4.20 1.09 -0.48 2.52** 
Market-Risk-Subj 4.76 5.17 5.15 4.52 4.60** 1.53 -6.21** 
Own-Return-Num 4.38 6.23 8.18 5.98 2.94** 3.32** -0.59 
Own-Risk-Num 0.053 0.078 0.067 0.087 6.74** -2.56** 3.59** 
Own-Return-Subj 3.89 3.91 4.17 4.42 -1.09 2.60** 2.53** 
Own-Risk-Subj 4.20 4.45 4.53 4.34 3.68** 1.29 -2.32** 
        
PastPerf-Ext -2.14 -12.57 -3.19 11.83 -7.41** 3.62** 7.05** 
PastPerf-Market-Num -8.20 -16.79 -6.96 13.86 -8.20** 7.78** 10.09** 
PastPerf-Market-Subj 2.32 1.82 2.42 5.27 -7.43** 4.64** 9.99** 
PastPerf-Own-Num -7.70 -18.51 -8.48 13.14 -9.52** 7.03** 9.20** 
PastPerf-Own-Subj 2.95 2.33 2.92 4.66 -7.26** 4.26** 8.20** 
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Table 4: Correlations between return and risk expectation measures for market and own 
portfolio 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between (a) numeric and subjective 
measures of return and risk expectations for market and own portfolios, respectively; (b) 
assessments for market portfolio and own portfolio of return and risk expectations, assessed either 
numerically or subjectively, respectively; and (c) risk and return expectations assessed either for 
market or own portfolio, numerically or subjectively, respectively. Panel A presents the analysis 
for absolute levels of variables , Panel B for changes in those variables from the previous time 
period to the indicated time period.  
Panel A: Correlations of absolute levels of variables 
(a) Numeric--Subjective Correlation   
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Market Portfolio Own Portfolio Market Portfolio 
Own 
Portfolio 
 "Sept08" 0.49 0.4 0.18 0.26 
 "Dec08" 0.49 0.49 0.18 0.26 
 "March09" 0.49 0.49 0.22 0.32 
 "June09" 0.64 0.55 0.3 0.18 
      
(b) Market—Own Correlation    
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept08" 0.48 0.47 0.63 0.27 
 "Dec08" 0.56 0.51 0.63 0.37 
 "March09" 0.64 0.45 0.58 0.31 
 "June09" 0.61 0.64 0.59 0.37 
      
(c) Risk--Return Correlation    
      
  Market Portfolio Own Portfolio  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept08" -0.05(ns) -0.26 0.21 0.1 
 "Dec08" -0.02(ns) -0.31 0.3 -.04(ns) 
 "March09" 0.12(ns) -0.32 0.29 -0.01(ns) 
 "June09" -.01(ns) -0.21 .11(ns) .01(ns) 
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Panel B: Correlations of changes in variables from previous to indicated time period 
(a) Numeric--Subjective Correlation   
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Market Portfolio Own Portfolio Market Portfolio Own Portfolio 
 "Sept08" --- --- --- --- 
 "Dec08" 0.22 0.30 -0.02(ns) -0.06(ns) 
 "March09" 0.18 0.25 0.07(ns) 0.07(ns) 
 "June09" 0.49 0.36 0.15 0.05(ns) 
      
(b) Market--Own Correlation    
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept08" --- --- --- --- 
 "Dec08" 0.58 0.42 0.48 0.14 
 "March09" 0.51 0.22 0.39 0.22 
 "June09" 0.34 0.33 0.74 0.07(ns) 
      
(c) Risk--Return Correlation    
      
  Market Portfolio Own Portfolio  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept08" --- --- --- --- 
 "Dec08" 0.02(ns) -0.22 0.05(ns) -0.04(ns) 
 "March09" 0.19 -0.09(ns) 0.11(ns) -0.06(ns) 
 "June09" -0.00(ns) -0.12(ns) 0.02(ns) 0.01(ns) 
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Table 5: Predictors of risk taking 
This table reports regression coefficients ) of clustered Tobit regressions where standard errors 
take clustering over subjects into account. The dependent variable in each model is risk taking 
(Risk Taking). Independent variables are: risk attitude, expectations, and past performance as well 
as demographic variables. The regressions include round dummies with round one as the baseline. 
Columns are explained in the text. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, and 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Type of Variable  1 2 3 4 
Why? Risk Attitude 2 3.47 ***  3.30 ***  3.27 ***  3.03 *** 
Why? Market-Return-Num  0.24** 0.29*** 0.38*** 
Why? Market-Risk-Num  -19.25 -19.07 -45.20** 
Why? Market-Return-Subj  5.75*** 5.33*** 5.40*** 
Why? Market-Risk-Subj  -4.27*** -4.13*** -2.95*** 
Why? Past Perf. Market Num   -0.11  
Why? Past Perf. Market Subj   0.87**  
Who? Age    0.04 
Who? Gender    9.47* 
Who? Dependents    1.67* 
Who? Decider    -10.17 
Who? Marital status    -5.00 
Who? Financial literacy    0.62 
Who? Income (categorical)    0.19 
Who? Wealth    0.59 
When? Round 2 -4.33** -3.47* -3.76* -4.41* 
When? Round 3 -10.28*** -10.94*** -10.97*** -10.46*** 
When? Round 4 -2.83 -8.59*** -10.95*** -6.27** 
 Constant 44.77*** 46.11*** 41.89*** 38.00*** 
 Observations 1264 1219 1216 876 
 
Decider: Do you make the financial decisions in the household?  
Financial literacy was measured using four questions. 
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Table 6: Changes in risk attitudes, expectations and past performance 
Mean changes in reported risk attitudes, expectations and past performance across time periods, 
separately for investors who took more risk or less risk in the second time period.  The Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test statistic indicates whether the change in the row variable is different for 
these two groups. * significant at 5% ; ** significant at 1% level. 
 Numeric Return Predictions Subjective Return Predictions 
 Market Portfolio Own Portfolio Market Portfolio Own Portfolio 
Predictors n = 1163 n = 1163 n = 1160 n = 1163 
PastPerf-Ext-Num     .005 .028 -.005* -.000 
PastPerf-Market-Num     .242** .108 .001 .001 
PastPerf-Market-Subj -1.052** -.289 .185*** .099*** 
PastPerf-Own-Num -.026 -.054 -.010*** -.006** 
PastPerf-Own-Subj -.042 .273 .178*** .221*** 
Constant 7.656*** 6.073** 2.602*** 3.031*** 
 
 
48 
 
Table 7. Regression coefficients for effects of past performance variables on numeric and 
subjective return expectations for market and personal portfolio.  
 significant at 5% ; ** significant at 1% level.; *** significant at 0.1% level 
 September - December  December – March March – June 
 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
>0 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
<0 
z-
score 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
>0 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
<0 
z-
score 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
>0 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
<0 
z-
score 
          
Diff. Risk 
Attitude 2 
0.18 0.01 0.54 0.04 -0.09 1.19 0.14 0.12 0.60 
Diff. Risk 
Attitude 6 
-0.01 0.22 -1.23 - - - - - - 
Diff. Risk 
Attitude 7 
0.03 -0.04 0.22 - - - - - - 
          
Diff. Market-
Return-Num 
0.94 3.94 -0.07 3.13 0.52 1.40 -0.14 -2.39 1.45 
Diff. Market-
Risk-Num 
0.02 0.03 -0.62 0.00 -0.01 1.57 0.02 0.02 0.35 
Diff. Market-
Return-Subj 
0.40 -0.03 2.02* 0.51 0.05 2.47* 0.58 -0.18 2.31* 
Diff. Market-
Risk-Subj 
-0.05 0.56 -3.35** -0.20 -0.02 -1.21 -0.69 -1.12 1.19 
Diff. Own-
Return-Num 
2.98 3.25 0.25 3.15 3.41 0.56 0.73 -0.15 1.36 
Diff. Own-Risk-
Num 
0.03 0.02 0.93 0.00 -0.02 2.09* 0.02 0.02 -0.43 
Diff. Own-
Return-Subj 
-0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.30 0.02 1.33 0.59 -0.03 2.07* 
Diff. Own-Risk-
Subj 
0.24 0.32 -0.77 0.46 0.06 1.27 -0.25 -0.18 -0.32 
          
Diff. Past Perf. 
External 
-8.99 -14.83 0.56 5.57 4.47 0.15 16.37 18.71 -1.52 
Diff. Past Perf. 
Market Num 
-11.84 -5.88 -1.42 9.04 10.10 -0.70 25.40 20.70 0.87 
Diff. Past Perf. 
Market Subj 
-0.70 -0.67 -0.17 0.35 0.68 -1.18 2.96 2.91 0.07 
Diff. Past Perf. 
Self Num 
-13.00 -12.89 0.60 11.60 8.91 0.40 22.71 19.11 0.94 
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Table 8: Predictors of changes in risk taking.  
This table reports regression coefficients of clustered Tobit regressions where standard errors take 
clustering over subjects into account. The dependent variable in each model is changes in risk 
taking (Diff. Risk Taking). Independent variables are changes in: risk attitude, expectations, and 
past performance as well as demographic variables. All change or differences variables are 
calculated for each person separately, as the value on the current survey minus the value on the 
previous survey. Columns are explained in the text. 
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, and *** significant at the 1% level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Diff. Risk Attitude 2 0.93   0.98 1.11 1.05 
Diff. Market-Return-Num   0.08  0.10 0.04 
Diff. Market-Risk-Num   3.23  6.47 9.88 
Diff. Market-Return-Subj  2.65***  2.62*** 2.33*** 2.32*** 
Diff. Market-Risk-Subj  -1.423*  -1.451* -1.52* -1.57** 
Diff. Past Perf. Market Num     -0.10  
Diff. Past Perf. Market Subj      0.25 
Demographics no no no no yes Yes 
Dummy-Period 2-1 -12.36 -10.14*** -12.49*** -10.26*** -13.66*** -9.50** 
Dummy-Period 3-2 -14.48*** -13.08*** -15.52*** -12.89*** -14.86*** -12.65*** 
Constant 7.99*** 6.17*** 8.19*** 6.09*** 10.15 5.03 
Observations 572 569 539 569 527 527 
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Figure 1.  
Value of Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) all-share index representing approximately 
98% of the UK‘s market capitalization from June08 to September09. 
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Figure 2. 
Mean percentage invested into risky market portfolio (diamond symbols), mean subjective market 
risk expectation (triangle symbols), and mean subjective market return expectation (square 
symbols) at four consecutive assessed time points. 
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Figure 3. 
Distribution in percentage of self-reported risk attitudes (Risk Attitude 6: ―I am a financial risk 
taker,‖ with categories ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree), by time of 
elicitation (Round 1 = Sept08, Round 2 = Dec08, Round 3 = March09, Round 4 = June09). 
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Figure 4. 
Results of Mediation Analysis. 
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Appendix  
 
Variable (Order) Exact wording of survey questions 
Risk Taking  
Risk Taking (3) 
(3) = third question 
―Now imagine you have an overall wealth of £100,000 and you could invest 
this amount either in a risk-free investment with a safe interest rate of 4% or 
into the UK stock market (FTSE all-share). How much would you invest in 
the in the UK stock market (FTSE all-share)?‖ 
 (0 = invest everything into the risk free asset; 100 = invest everything into 
the risky stock market). 
Risk Attitude  
Risk Attitude 2 (7)  
―It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment.‖ 
(1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 6 (8) 
―I am a financial risk taker.‖  
(1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 7 (9) 
―Even if I experienced a significant loss on an investment, I would still 
consider making risky investments.‖ 
(1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Expectations  
Market-Return-Num. 
Market-Risk-Num(4). 
―In the next questions, we would like you to make three estimates of future 
stock market returns. 
* Your middle estimate should be your best guess (as likely be above the 
actual value as below it); 
* Your high estimate should be lower than the actual value very rarely 
(about once in 20 estimates); 
* Your low estimate should be above the actual value very rarely (about 
once in 20 estimates); 
 
Please enter your response as a percent, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as -X%. 
The return of the UK stock market (FTSE all-share) in 3 months:‖ 
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For Market-Return-Num. the middle estimate is used. 
For Market-Risk-Num. the implicit expected volatility is calculated from the 
high and low estimates using the two-point approximation by Keefer and 
Bodily (1983). 
Market-Return-Subj.(1) 
―How would you rate the returns you expect from an investment in the UK 
stock market (FTSE-All- Share) over the next 3 months?‖  
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
Market-Risk-Subj.(2) 
―Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the UK stock market 
(FTSE-All- Share) is?‖  
(1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Own-Return-Num. 
Own-Risk-Num. (12) 
―In the next questions, we would like you to make three estimates of future 
returns on investments held with us. 
* Your middle estimate should be your best guess (as likely be above the 
actual value as below it); 
* Your high estimate should be lower than the actual value very rarely 
(about once in 20 estimates); 
* Your low estimate should be above the actual value very rarely (about 
once in 20 estimates); 
 
Please enter your response as a percent, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as -X%. 
 
The return of your portfolio held with us in 3 months time:‖ 
 
For Own-Return-Num. the middle estimate is used. 
For Own-Risk-Num. the implicit expected volatility is calculated from the 
high and low estimates using the two-point approximation by Keefer and 
Bodily (1983). 
Own-Return-Subj.(13) 
―How would you rate the returns you expect from your own portfolio over 
the next 3 months?‖  
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
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Own-Risk-Subj.(14) 
―Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the investments in your 
own portfolio are?‖  
(1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Past Performance  
PastPerf.-External (15) 
―What do you think your return (percentage change) of investments held 
elsewhere over the past three months was? 
 
If you hold all of your investable assets with us, enter zero. 
 
Please enter your response as a percent change, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as 
-X%.‖ 
PastPerf.-Market-Num. 
(10) 
―What do you think the UK stock market (FTSE all-share) return 
(percentage change) over past three months was? 
Please enter your response as a percent change, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as 
-X%.‖ 
PastPerf.-Market-Subj 
(11). 
―How would you rate the returns of the UK stock markets (FTSE-All-Share) 
over the past 3 months?‖ 
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
PastPerf.-Own-Num.(5) 
―What do you think your return (percentage change) with us over past three 
months was? 
Please enter your response as a percent change, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as 
-X%.‖ 
PastPerf.-Own-Subj.(6) 
―How would you rate the returns of your portfolio (all investments held with 
us) over the past three months?‖ 
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
 
 
